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The purpose of this paper is to explore how normative political theory can be related to the debates concerning the legalization of IR. Modern IR theory largely sidelined questions of justice, partly because justice was considered an institutional virtue and anarchical international politics was said to lack the relevant institutions but also because justice was a normative idea and as such fell outside the purview of a largely positivist discipline. The empirical legalization literature has increasingly challenged the portrayal of IR as lacking relevant institutions and constructivist contributions to these debates have enriched our understanding of the normative context in which the constitution of the international legal order develops. Yet the gap between the legalization literature and that exploring questions of international justice remains significant. The convenors of this workshop in their call for papers identify, as a crucial problem, the failure of normative political theory to engage with the relevant facts of the international legal order and the failure of the empirical researchers to engage with the relevant normative debates. I want to begin by saying a few words about this very real gap in contemporary scholarship before looking at one way of bridging this divide. In the second part of this paper I develop an account of institutional moral reasoning that, I argue, enables us to explore the idea of international justice in its relation to the legalisation of international affairs and I explore the ways in which our account of justice must be disciplined by a proper respect for the law. Finally, I turn back to the law to explore the claim that humanitarian and human rights norms have evolved to the point where radical legal and political reform is called for.
I
I want to start, not with the institutionalist literature on the legalization of international politics but with the constructivist critique of that literature. My purpose is not to rehearse the arguments that frame the discussions that we are likely to have over the course of our week in Münster. Rather I want to begin to explore the distance between the normative (understood in constructivist terms) and the normative (as commonly understood in moral terms). law 'within broader historical contexts that construct its elements (preferences, beliefs and so on)'. 3 At a basic level the requirement that we seek legal normativity in normative enquiry is simply a claim about causal depth (casting causality in constitutive terms). It is, as Wendt puts it, simply 'part of what is going on in institutional design'. 4 But there is, as most (if not all) constructivists recognise, a third use of the term normative involved in the analysis. A focus on social norms leads us to a discussion of 'normative desirability', 5 to think about legitimacy and justice -the normative in the moral or ethical sense. As Finnemore and Toope point out,
Legal claims are legitimate and persuasive only if they are rooted in reasoned argument that creates analogies with past practise, demonstrates congruence with the overall systemic logic of existing law and attends to the contemporary social aspirations of the larger moral fabric of society.
6
The politics of international law is intimately tied up with the debates surrounding the right, the good, the just, the legitimate. Indeed Wendt's critique of the rational design model of international law points out that all the really interesting political questions are closed to the rationalist and I want to reinforce this point about the inherently moral element of the normative debates surrounding legal normativity by quoting from Wendt's critique of positivist position on institutional legal design. It is this final set of questions that keeps normative IR theorists up at nights -not, I
hope, because we are other-worldly but precisely because they arise in the context of any sensible discussion of the legalisation of international politics. Some political theorists feel able to ignore (as a matter of moral theory) the sociological or the legal.
These scholars develop an account of justice, whether based on an account of human vulnerabilities, 11 capabilities, 12 moral powers 13 The idea that institutional moral reasoning (to adopt Buchanan's phrase rather than to endorse his complete idea) grants access to the moral, legal and political debates imposes certain constraints on the theoretical enterprise. The constraint might best be understood as the requirement that the theorist respect the institutional autonomy of the international legal order (ILO). The idea that we need to think in terms of the institutional autonomy of the ILO is found most clearly in the work of Christian ReusSmit who uses this term and suggests that we need to focus on the distinctive ways that legal norms are used and the institutional process that enable or constitute the 'socially sanctioned' interpretation of such rules. 21 However it is also found in Allen
Buchanan's argument that a moral theory of international law needs to be paradigm'. 33 In his later work it also underpins the very thin but politically urgent rights to life and liberty that begin his account of human rights. Ultimately, in that startling essay 'Governing the Globe' we find Walzer musing on the next evolution of global society on the basis of these reiterated shared ideas. The very idea that there are acts that shock the conscience of mankind provides a sociological universalism which allows Walzer to make global normative and political claims. Under the influence of the concepts of human rights, of obligations erga omnes…and of peremptory norms, international law has embarked on a limited transition from bilateral legal relations to a system based on community interests and objective normative relationships.
54
It is the development of this hierarchy of norms that suggests to some the subversion of the state-consent model of international law and its replacement with a hierarchy of universally binding, human rights based norms.
While the categories of norms erga omnes and jus cogens have been recognized in courts, treaties and the declaratory statements of key actors and scholars the idea that we have an uncontroversial hierarchy of norms is still hotly disputed. There is general consensus that reference to such norms has been largely (although not solely) doctrinal and rhetorical. 55 Nevertheless the way these categories respond to 'community interests' and issues of global public policy, core values such as 'basic human rights' and pressing challenges such as environmental change where international society can ill-afford to wait for consensual instruments to develop gives the political theorist interested in the development of justice rather than law in itself significant pause for thought. Nevertheless it is essential, if we are to respect the theoretical requirements of institutional autonomy or institutional moral reasoning laid out above that we tread very carefully on this crucial ground. 54 Meron, Humanization, p.187, p.256. 55 substantive norms where systemic norms are inherent in the character of the ILO.
Thus such principles would be those such as pacta sunt servanda, recognition and consent. 58 However, the more radical interpretation places the emphasis on the centrality of certain substantive norms such as the prohibition on the use of force, self-determination and fundamental human rights. 59 The crucial issue here, of course, is the extent to which international law has moved beyond a voluntarist model of legal obligation in deference to what Charney terms universal law. rights culture suggests that we need radical reform. If we return to the continuum of theoretical positions outlined in earlier sections the most radical argument is found in Buchanan's cosmopolitan account of legal reform demanded by a human rights based conception of justice. Underpinning all the detailed and finely crafted argument about reforming the law relating to intervention, state legitimacy, recognition and secession is the claim that human rights can and must be used in the place of state-consent as the basis for legal reform. 70 Buchanan's position is useful here partly because it offers a very detailed argument on the themes addressed by this paper and partly because he develops a very clear commitment to institutional moral reasoning. His insistence that we do not have to engage with the moral argument in order to develop a human rights based conception of justice rests primarily on the claim that progressive conservatism is an essential element of reasoning about legal reform. However, it also rests on the thought that a cosmopolitan account of human rights and human rights as developed by the ILO are relevantly similar and therefore that a systematic application of the principles inherent in the ILO will yield cosmopolitan conclusions. 71 However, if we look at the development of human rights law, at the ways in which it radiates into other key areas of international law and at the community of practise that has grown up around it the evidence suggests that a great deal of care has been taken to ensure that such considerations of humanity are compatible with pluralist rather than cosmopolitan institutional structures. The scholarly consensus seems to be that we must manage the development of this element of international law to avoid 'foisting' So from whichever point one starts, the search for shared principles of justice will need to enquire in to the social, moral and political conditions that make for a meaningful global moral community and the degree to which they correspond to what actually exists or is likely to exist. ..Global justice is not something that can be deduced from rational principles, nor can it be reflected in a single world view religious or secular; It is, rather, a negotiated product of dialogue and deliberation and therefore always subject to revision and reevaluation." international community's willingness to tolerate breaches of the law where humanitarian concerns necessitate it and in the increasing acknowledgment of community norms in political discourse. Theorists of global justice who require the sort of moral, legal and political accessibility that this inter-disciplinary argument offers need to recognise that there is a balance to be struck between moral theory, law and politics.
So where does this leave normative political theory? When Amartya Sen laid out his idea of justice he emphasised, in the opening passages, the importance of partial rather than transcendental approaches to justice. 77 Here we are enjoined to work to resolve obvious injustice rather than aim at an ideal institutional expression of justice.
A casuistical, incremental and partial approach seems to me to have the potential to remain within the bounds of institutional moral reasoning and to offer a directive account of normative desirability. There is a lot of work to be done on the nature of normative IR theory that is capable of adding to the legalization debates. A lot of this work will be looking at the role of reason in relation to the norms of contemporary international society (or the relative priority of philosophy to democracy as Walzer and Rorty style it). 78 Moral theory has to be capable of offering a critical perspective rather than simply aping the development of the normative fabric of international society. Nevertheless a critically relevant theory has to nurture its relationship with the legal and political even as it seeks to settle very hard cases by getting involved in an analysis of the basic (and shifting) justifications for the institutions in which such
